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Zoning and
Land Use
Planning
PATRICIA E. SALKIN*
Law of the Land - Year
in Review
During the summer of 2007
I embarked on a new venture to
develop a blog on land use law.
The idea behind the blog, titled
‘‘Law of the Land,’’ (see:
http://lawoftheland.albanylaw.
edu) was to create a site of in-
terest to land use lawyers, plan-
ners, developers, professors
and students. After surveying a
variety of blogs, websites and
publications, the concept be-
hind the blog was developed -
a site that would be updated
daily with a review of a recent
land use case decided by a state
or federal court. Whenever pos-
sible, the case review would be
preceded or followed by brief
commentary explaining the
signicance of the case or the
lesson learned. In addition, the
site has reported on some rele-
vant gubernatorial executive
orders, oers book reviews,
and occasionally starts a dis-
cussion on current events is-
sues, such as climate change.
Readers can post comments
about the case or posting of the
day, and sometimes this has led
to robust debate about the hold-
ings in particular land use
cases. The site also contains
links to other blogs about land
use and zoning law, links to
websites of interest, and a list-
ing of upcoming land use law
conferences.
With more than 100 reported
cases discussed on the blog, the
largest number of cases ad-
dressed takings, followed by
the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act,
signs, due process, noncon-
forming uses, adult business
uses, ethics, and historic pres-
ervation. Wireless communica-
tions, vested rights, standing
and issues involving zoning in-
terpretation were also the sub-
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ject of litigation. A signicant
number of zoning cases were
decided by the federal courts,
and Pennsylvania, Ohio, Cali-
fornia, New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut. This column
reviews trends and interesting
cases in land use law as re-
ported on Law of the Land dur-
ing the last half of 2007.
Adult Entertainment
Facilities
Two of the reported adult
entertainment facilities opin-
ions determined that local zon-
ing ordinances were unconsti-
tutional. The rst case, H.D.V.-
Greektown, LLC v. City of
Detroit, 2007 WL 2261418,
involved Detroit, Michigan’s
adult entertainment ordinance.
Following 1999 amendments
to the zoning ordinance of the
City of Detroit, the plainti’s
establishment, ‘‘The Zoo
Bar,’’ a topless entertainment
business, was grandfathered in
as a nonconforming use in the
City’s Zone B6 (the Central
Business District). In 2002, an-
other business entered into a
conditional purchase agree-
ment to acquire all of the plain-
ti’s assets, including a liquor
license, topless activity permit
and cabaret license. The State
Liquor Control Commission
forwarded the application to
the City for its consideration.
In 2003 and 2004 the City
passed resolutions which in es-
sence stated that where there
are application requests for ap-
proval and/or transfer of licen-
ses that have been issued by the
State Liquor Control Commis-
sion, including topless activity
permits, and where the bar
making the request is a noncon-
forming use, located in a dis-
trict where the use is no longer
allowed, there will be a pre-
sumptive disapproval by the
City Council. The plaintis ini-
tiated this lawsuit in March
2006, preceding the City Coun-
cil’s November 2006 rejection
of their transfer application,
challenging the constitutional-
ity of the adult use provisions
of the City’s zoning ordinance,
including the fact there are no
time constraints imposed upon
them to evaluate an application
or to render a decision; and al-
leging that by requiring two
levels of approval from the City
an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on speech exists.
The federal court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
held that the local law did
amount to an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech since
it lacked specic standards to
guide the decision-maker in
judging whether a permit
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should be issued. Furthermore,
the Court pointed out that a
‘‘prior restraint that fails to
place limits on the time within
which the decision-maker must
issue the license is impermis-
sible.’’ The Court noted with
concern that the conditional
use permit, the planned devel-
opment and the regulated use
provisions of the City’s zoning
ordinance fail to provide dead-
lines for the granting or deny-
ing of applications by the ap-
propriate governmental body.
As a result, the Court con-
cluded that the zoning ordi-
nance violates the First
Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution as a prior restraint on
speech.
The second case nding an
unconstitutional regulatory
scheme arose in the Village of
Washington Park, Illinois,
where apparently, the Village
relies on this industry for al-
most all of its income. In Joel-
ner v. Village of Washington
Park, Illinois, 2007 WL
4064511, the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals examined a Village
ordinance designed to regulate
adult entertainment facilities
by expanding the permissible
hours of operation after dark,
mandating that the establish-
ments close in the morning be-
tween 6:00 a.m. and 11:00
a.m., allowing partial nudity
and on-site masturbation (but
neither patrons nor employees
can appear in ‘‘a state of com-
plete nudity’’), and prohibiting
the sale or consumption of al-
cohol on site except in ‘‘enti-
ties licensed as adult cabarets
under prior Village ordi-
nances.’’ The ordinance con-
tains both a preamble and nd-
ings asserting that the
ordinance aims ‘‘to establish
reasonable and uniform regula-
tions to prevent the deleterious
secondary eects of sexually
oriented businesses within the
Village.’’ The Village did not
conduct its own secondary ef-
fects study, but rather refer-
enced the ‘‘ndings and nar-
rowing constructions’’ in 19
listed federal court opinions.
While some of these opinions
refer to secondary eects of
combining alcohol with adult
entertainment, the Court notes
that none of them claim that al-
lowing alcohol sales to con-
tinue at already-operating ven-
ues and banning it only from
future establishments amelio-
rates the harm from combining
the two. The Plainti had been
trying to obtain a permit to op-
erate a cabaret in the Village
for some time, and alleged that
as a result of local politics, he
has been unable to secure the
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needed permits. He alleged that
the alcohol ban at issue was
adopted not to address second-
ary eects, but rather to stie
competition with current caba-
ret license holders who would
still be able to serve alcohol,
making it impossible for his
business venue to compete.
The 7th Circuit noted that
the three prong test to be ap-
plied to the ordinance banning
alcohol is a two-stage process:
1) whether the ordinance was
passed pursuant to a legitimate
governmental power; 2)
whether it does not totally ban
all adult entertainment; and 3)
whether it is aimed at combat-
ing the negative secondary ef-
fects caused by adult entertain-
ment establishments. If all
three prongs are satised, the
ordinance is constitutional if it
survives intermediate scrutiny
(e.g., substantial governmental
interest, narrowly tailored and
reasonable alternative avenues
of communication are avail-
able). However, where the
regulation is not aimed at sec-
ondary eects (it fails the third
prong) then strict scrutiny ap-
plies (e.g., regulation must be
necessary to achieve a compel-
ling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that end). In
upholding the nding of the
trial court, the Circuit Court
found that backdated licenses
(to allow others, and not the
plainti, to serve alcohol at
their facilities); expansion of
hours of operation (rather than
limiting hours); and proof of
lack of enforcement of an exist-
ing prohibition on complete
nudity; all supported the plain-
ti’s allegation that the new
ordinance was not designed to
address negative secondary ef-
fects of adult entertainment,
but rather to limit competition.
Therefore, under a strict scru-
tiny analysis, the ordinance was
unconstitutional because a
‘‘ban on alcohol in only newly
licensed establishments can not
possibly be considered less nar-
rowly tailored.’’ The Court
noted that the ordinance perma-
nently insulates eight concen-
trated establishments from the
ban and leaves alcohol use at
those establishments otherwise
entirely unrestricted, and that
the Court had previously held
in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of
Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (2003),
that ‘‘a complete ban of alcohol
in the premises of adult enter-
tainment establishments is the
only way the Village can ad-
vance that interest.’’
Ordinances regulating adult
entertainment facilities were
upheld in a number of other
cases. For example, in Smartt
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v. City of Laredo, 2007 WL
3087495, a Texas Appeals
Court upheld the application of
sexually oriented business
regulations to an existing use
in an annexed area. In 1995, a
business involving nude danc-
ers was established outside the
city limits. In 1998, the prop-
erty was annexed by the City
and the City amended its exist-
ing ordinance to require the
previously existing sexually
oriented businesses to obtain a
license to operate and to refrain
from operating within 1,000
feet of a residential area. The
city obtained an injunction
from operating against the
owner of this business since it
was within 1,000 feet of a resi-
dential area. The business
owner argued that his use was
‘‘grandfathered’’ because the
business was operating prior to
the annexation. The Court
found no authority for such a
proposition, and noted that the
Texas Supreme Court has held
that under reasonable condi-
tions, zoning ordinances may
be applied to end previously
existing nonconforming uses.
The business owner next ar-
gued that his business is not an
‘‘establishment,’’ which is the
word used in the regulations. In
reviewing the denition and the
activities that take place on the
premises, the Court concluded
that evidence existed to support
the lower court’s determination
that the use constituted a
‘‘sexually oriented business’’
irrespective of the denition of
‘‘establishment.’’ As to the
constitutionality of the regula-
tions, the Court held that the
regulation was content neutral
and that regulating the negative
secondary eects of such a use
amount to a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction.
The Court noted that the regu-
lations did not completely ban
the use, and that ‘‘a municipal-
ity has a substantial interest in
preserving the quality of urban
life . . . .’’
In denying a motion for a
preliminary injunction in Bot-
toms Up Enterprises, Inc. v.
Borough of Homestead, 2007
WL 2908762, the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania deter-
mined that the Township’s zon-
ing, licensing and regulatory
provisions restricting adult en-
tertainment establishments did
not violate the First Amend-
ment. Here the Plaintis sought
to open a high-end supper club
with semi-nude dancing in a
central business district that
permitted restaurants but pro-
hibited adult live entertainment
facilities and exotic dance
clubs with nude performers.
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After the plainti’s attorney
indicated that the performers
would not be nude, the Bor-
ough Council amended the def-
inition of ‘‘adult live entertain-
ment facility’’ in the zoning
ordinance to specically in-
clude references to performers
wearing g-strings and opaque
coverings, or ‘‘pasties,’’ and
they enacted an ordinance to
increase from 500 feet to 1,000
feet the setback requirement
between any adult use and cer-
tain ‘‘sensitive uses’’ which
include primary and secondary
schools, places of worship,
parks, day-care centers, child
nursery schools, a library, an
existing dwelling not owned by
the owner of the adult use, or
any site marked on the ocial
map as a proposed future park.
The Borough asserted that
these ordinances were reason-
able time, place and manner
regulations of speech, and that
they were aimed at combating
the negative secondary eects
caused by adult live entertain-
ment facilities, they were nar-
rowly tailored, and that they
were not directed at suppress-
ing the erotic message. Further-
more, such facilities were al-
lowed in the second largest
zoning district in the munici-
pality subject to conditional
use permit review. The Plain-
tis did not le an application
for a permit, but rather initiated
a lawsuit alleging that there
was no evidence that the ordi-
nances were aimed at combat-
ing negative secondary eects
when the ordinances were en-
acted (because this information
was stated subsequent to the
adoption), and that their facil-
ity would not be able to be sited
in the other zoning district that
conditionally allowed such
uses due to the amount of land
available and the existence of
restrictive covenants.
The Court held that it could
consider testimony presented
regarding the legislative pur-
pose for the enactment of the
ordinances since the Third Cir-
cuit has held that ‘‘a municipal-
ity can support its ordinance
with a factual basis even if that
basis was not present to the
legislative body prior to the
enactment of the measure at is-
sue.’’ The Court then consid-
ered the type of information or
evidence relied upon regarding
secondary eects, and con-
cluded that ‘‘studies from other
urban environments are rele-
vant and do provide a connec-
tion to actual adult busi-
nesses.’’ The Court further
concluded that the increase in
the setback provision did not
directly aect the plaintis
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since they had not applied to
locate a use in that zoning dis-
trict, and that there were ade-
quate alternatives available. In
relying on City of Renton, 475
U.S. at 53 and Dia v. City of
Toledo, 937 F. Supp. 673, 678
(N.D. Ohio 1996), the court
concluded that regardless of
whether they considered the
Borough’s assertion that there
would be 52 acres of land avail-
able to site the use (14% of the
total acreage of the municipal-
ity), or the plaintis’ assertion
that there would be 19 acres
available (5% of the total acre-
age), even using the lower
number there is sucient land
available.
In another case, Tollis Inc.,
v. County of San Diego, 2007
WL 2937012, the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the
City of San Diego’s regulation
requiring the location of adult
uses in industrial zones. In
2002, to combat the negative
secondary eects that concen-
trate in and around adult busi-
nesses, the County of San Di-
ego adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance addressing
adult entertainment businesses
located within the unincorpo-
rated portions of the county.
Among other things, the law
restricts the hours of operation
of these businesses, requires re-
moval of doors on peep show
booths and mandates dispersal
of these businesses to industrial
areas within the county. The
plaintis alleged both federal
and state constitutional viola-
tions. The District Court
granted summary judgment to
the County, upholding the re-
quirement that adult establish-
ments locate only in industrial
zones, and it dismissed the state
law claim regarding confor-
mance to the County’s general
plan (because the plainti
failed to raise the claim in its
complaint). The District Court
did hold unconstitutional the
County’s permitting system for
adult establishments since it
granted the licensing authority
an unreasonably long period of
time to consider a permit re-
quest. By severing the oend-
ing time limits from the ordi-
nance, the Court was able to
uphold the rest of the law.
In upholding the industrial
zone restriction, the Court ex-
amined the third prong of the
Renton test, to wit, that the
regulation must serve a sub-
stantial government interest, be
narrowly tailored to serve that
interest, and allow for reason-
able alternative avenues of
communication. The plaintis
argued that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Alameda Books
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imposed a heightened eviden-
tiary burden on the County to
show ‘‘how speech would
fare’’ under the ordinance. The
Ninth Circuit disagreed with
this interpretation, explaining
that ‘‘So long as there are a suf-
cient number of suitable relo-
cation sites, the County could
reasonably assume that, given
the draw of pornographic and
sexually explicit speech, will-
ing patrons would not be mea-
surably discouraged by the in-
convenience of having to travel
to an industrial zone.’’ The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the
District Court’s determination
that 68 potential sites were
available in the industrial
zones, on which eight to 10
adult businesses could operate,
and that this was sucient to
allow the plainti to relocate.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the District Court’s dismissal
of the state claim for failure to
raise it in the complaint, but
disagreed with the District
Court’s manner of severance of
the oending period of time for
processing an adult business
license. The Ninth Circuit said
that once the oending time
limit is removed from the text
of the ordinance (in this case it
was between 130 and 140
days), then the ordinance con-
tains no time limits at all for the
review of license requests, and
that too is unconstitutional. The
Ninth Circuit remanded this is-
sue to the District Court to cor-
rect its severance order which
should still sever the oending
section and no longer require
the license until such time as
the ordinance is amended. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that
the remaining provisions of the
local ordinance would continue
to remain in eect.
Condemnation/Eminent
Domain
Post Kelo, eminent domain,
once a specialty for attorneys
concentrating in condemnation
law, has been prominent on the
radar screen of land use law-
yers. Two recent cases warrant
mention in this column. In De-
cember, a New York appellate
court held that eminent domain
could be used to preserve farm-
land in In the Matter of Aspen
Creek Estates Ltd. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 2007 WL
4246603. The ‘‘Manorville
Farmland Protection Area’’
within the Town of
Brookhaven is an approxi-
mately 500-acre working farm
belt that is a high priority pres-
ervation target for the Town.
The Town had previously ac-
quired development rights to
four farms in the area, preserv-
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ing approximately 112 acres of
farmland. The Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department up-
held the Town’s decision to
exercise its power of eminent
domain to condemn property in
the protection area for the pur-
pose of preserving its use as
farmland because such action
serves a legitimate public pur-
pose. The Town Board said that
the property was being ac-
quired to, among other things,
‘‘preserve open space and agri-
cultural resources, protect and
promote continuation of agri-
culture in the Town, ensure the
continued sale of fresh, locally
grown produce, prevent con-
icts between residential
homeowners and adjacent
farmers.’’ Furthermore, the
Board found that the condem-
nation would help to ensure the
protection of scenic vistas and
the rural character of the area.
Prior to initiating the condem-
nation action, the Town sought
to acquire the property through
a negotiated sale. The Town’s
Open Space Environmental
Bond Act Committee had au-
thorized purchase of the land in
2003, but the current owners
(Aspen Creek) were in negotia-
tion to purchase it as well and
they outbid the Town, purchas-
ing the property in 2004 for
$1.4 million. Thereafter, the
Town attempted to purchase
the development rights to the
property from Aspen Creek,
and after a series of oers, the
Town increased its bid to $4.
004million, which was roughly
half a million dollars more than
the highest appraisal, and also
oered to let Aspen build three
houses on the property. After
this oer was rejected, the
Town began the process of ac-
quiring the property and devel-
opment rights through condem-
nation.
Among other things, Aspen
Creek argued that the Town’s
condemnation violated the
State’s Eminent Domain Pro-
cedure Law (EDPL) because it
did not serve a public purpose
and because the Town’s true
intent was to take the subject
property and lease it to private
farmers. With respect to the is-
sue of whether the condemna-
tion serves a public purpose,
the Court concluded that the
Town’s stated reasons—pre-
serving farmland, maintaining
open space and scenic vistas—
are all legitimate public pur-
poses. The Court noted that the
preservation of farmland ‘‘con-
fers a benet upon the public,
since it enables residents of the
Town to enjoy locally grown
produce and scenic views.’’
The Court also found that the
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preservation of farmland is
consistent with the public
policy of the State to ‘‘pro-
mote, foster, and encourage the
agricultural industry,’’ (citing
to N.Y. Ag. & Mkts. L. sec. 3)
and ‘‘preservation of open
space and enhancement of nat-
ural resources.’’ (citing to N.Y.
Gen. Mun. L. sec. 247[1]).
Lastly, the Court noted that the
Town residents believe that
protection of open spaces and
natural resources is important
because they overwhelmingly
supported a $20 million bond
act of such purpose in 2002 and
a bond act of up to $100 mil-
lion in 2004 for preservation of
open space, farmland and wild-
life habitats. As to Aspen’s
claim that the condemnation is
unconstitutional because the
true purpose is to bestow a pri-
vate benet on certain individu-
als (e.g., farmers), the Court
found that this allegation had
no factual support in the record
and is insucient to demon-
strate bad faith. The Court said
that ‘‘the mere fact that the
condemnation will provide in-
cidental benets to private indi-
viduals does not invalidate the
condemnor’s determination as
long as the public purpose is
dominant.’’ Further, the Court
maintained that since the land
had been continuously farmed
for more than a century prior to
the Aspen purchase, ‘‘allowing
farming to continue on the
property is fully consistent with
the purpose of the condemna-
tion, the fact that one or more
individuals may benet is
merely incidental, and does not
render the public benet to be
achieved by condemnation il-
lusory.’’ The Court said that a
comprehensive development
plan was not required pursuant
to Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005), because
that condemnation was based
upon the public purpose of eco-
nomic development, and here
the public purpose was farm-
land and open space protection.
In a case dealing with the
Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and eminent do-
main, the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that RLUIPA
does not apply to the condem-
nation of a religious cemetery.
In St. John’s United Church of
Christ v. The City of Chicago,
502 F.3d 616, the Court held
that the O’Hare Modernization
Act (the ‘‘OMA’’), which,
among other things, amended
the Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (IRFRA) and
excluded the O’Hare expansion
project from IRFRA’s reach,
does not violate the U.S. Con-
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stitution or the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (RLUIPA). The State
Legislature passed the OMA in
2003 to facilitate improve-
ments and expansion to the air-
port. St. John’s United Church
claimed that the City’s attempt
to condemn a cemetery located
on Church property violated
the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause, the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and the
RLUIPA.
On the Constitutional claims
the Court found that the ‘‘ob-
ject’’ of the OMA was to clear
all legal obstacles to the
O’Hare expansion project, and
not to target the religious cem-
eteries that (among many other
properties) the City needs to
acquire. Hence the inquiry re-
quired in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi-
aleah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) was
satised because the OMA did
not ‘‘infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their reli-
gious motivation.’’ The Court
concluded that, ‘‘there is noth-
ing inherently religious about
cemeteries or graves, and the
act of relocating them thus does
not on its face infringe upon a
religious practice, as Lukumi
uses that term.’’ In dismissing
the Equal Protection claim, the
Court found that the statute did
not classify St. John’s cemetery
on the basis of religion, and
further that the airport expan-
sion was a compelling govern-
mental interest.
With respect to the RLUIPA
claim, interestingly, the Court
started by stating that they as-
sumed the constitutionality of
the statute based upon the U. S.
Supreme Court holding in Cut-
ter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709
(2005), but since the constitu-
tionality of the land use section
of RLUIPA was not raised by
the parties here, they were sav-
ing that issue for another day.
The Court next turned to the
denition of ‘‘land use regula-
tion’’ in the statute, which pro-
vides, ‘‘[A] zoning or land-
marking law, or the application
of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant’s use or
development of land (including
a structure axed to land), if
the claimant has an ownership,
leasehold, easement, servitude,
or other property interest in the
regulated land or a contract or
option to acquire such an inter-
est.’’ (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(5)).The Court determined
that RLUIPA did not apply
here because the OMA was not
a ‘‘land use regulation.’’ In do-
ing so, the Court commented
on the distinction between zon-
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ing and eminent domain and
cited Faith Temple Church v.
Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp.
2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
Nonconforming Uses
A signicant number of
cases focused on whether ap-
plicants were entitled to non-
conforming use status on their
land. Typically, when estab-
lishing a legally existing non-
conforming business use, own-
ers will produce all kinds of
records to demonstrate that the
business was operational prior
to the enactment of the zoning
or zoning amendment. In this
case, the property owner was
able to do that, but the court
relied on the small amount of
revenue generated from the use
during that time to determine
that the use was not signicant
enough to qualify for noncon-
forming status. As a result, the
court never got to what might
have been the more appropri-
ate inquiry—whether the
change in intensity constituted
an impermissible enlargement
or expansion of a nonconform-
ing use.
The South Dakota Supreme
Court, in City of Platte v. Over-
weg, 2007 WL 2460112, noted
that prior to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance, the property
owner was employed at an au-
tomobile garage, but that he
moonlighted doing occasional
auto repair work from his resi-
dence, located in a residential-
only district. The Court, in con-
sidering sales tax reports the
business owner submitted to
the State, showing under $200
in income prior to the adoption
of the zoning ordinance, deter-
mined that during that time the
business use of the property
was minimal and sporadic. The
court noted that only after the
eective date of the zoning or-
dinance did the business use
increase in intensity. Speci-
cally, subsequent to the eec-
tive date of the zoning ordi-
nance, the property owner quit
his primary employment and
opened up his own glass and
auto repair shop on his residen-
tially zoned property. As a re-
sult, the Court said the property
owner failed to meet his burden
to ‘‘clearly establish the prior
use to avail himself of the
grandfather rights.’’
Similarly, in Michigan, the
law does not allow property
owners to acquire nonconform-
ing use status in their land if the
use has not been fully opera-
tional prior to new or changed
zoning. In Vanfarowe v. Cas-
cade Charter Township, 2007
WL 3309920, the Michigan
Appellate Court remanded a
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case involving a special use
permit to construct a boat
launch on a lot owned by a
homeowners association to de-
termine whether the lot is en-
titled to nonconforming use
status. The lot at issue was con-
veyed to the Goodwood Plat
Owners, Inc. (GPO) in 1950 as
part of a riverfront subdivision
development. In 1991, the
owners of the lots in the Good-
wood Plat, upon discovering
that the GPO has lapsed as a
corporation for failure to le
annual reports, formed the cur-
rent GPO by incorporation in
1992, ling a successful suit to
conrm ownership of the
deeded lot for the boat launch.
A quitclaim deed was executed
to the GPO in 1996 subject to
certain owage rights and re-
strictions in the zoning ordi-
nance. The lot is only 75 feet
wide, but the zoning regulation
requires a minimum of 100 feet
of lake frontage. Following a
public hearing, the Township
granted GPO a special use per-
mit, determining that the 100
foot minimum did not apply
because the GPO was entitled
to nonconforming use status,
going back to the 1950 dedica-
tion. The Township, however,
made no ndings of fact as to
how the lot in question had
been used in the past. Neigh-
bors appealed, alleging among
other things, that the determi-
nation that the lot was entitled
to nonconforming use status
was without basis in law and
not based upon any material
evidence claiming that there
has been no tangible change in
the land nor work of a substan-
tial character performed on the
property.
In reviewing the case law in
Michigan with respect to non-
conforming uses, the Court
noted that to acquire noncon-
forming use status, ‘‘there must
be work of a ‘substantial char-
acter’ done by way of prepara-
tion for an actual use of the
premises.’’ The Court noted
that in previous Michigan
cases, the following activities
were not enough to entitle own-
ers to nonconforming use sta-
tus: obtaining a building per-
mit, ordering plans, surveying
property, tearing down a barn
and moving a house (City of
Lansing v. Dawley, 247 Mich.
394); construction of a road,
surveying and subdividing a
plat, grading and excavating
the sites, and installing 11 mo-
bile homes (Gackler Land Co.,
Inc. v. Yankee Springs Twp.,
427 Mich. 562); development
of a site plan, the clearing of
trees and the construction of a
commercial well and well-
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house (Heath Twp. v. Sall, 442
Mich. 434); and obtaining -
nancing, purchasing insurance,
application for permits, design-
ing of barn and manure pit lay-
outs, obtaining quotes for the
construction and signed con-
tracts with suppliers, grading
the site and construction of the
barn and manure sewage sys-
tem (Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze,
241 Mich. App. 324).
Because there were no nd-
ings of fact in the record below
as to what, if any, work of a
substantial nature had been
done to the lot, the Court re-
manded the matter. However,
based upon the long list of ac-
tivities deemed not to be sub-
stantial by Michigan courts, it
appears as though it will be
very dicult for the property
owners to establish noncon-
forming use status in this case,
and seeking a variance may be
an alternative course of action
to pursue.
Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA)
A large number of reported
cases in the last six months of
2007 focused on the siting of
religious uses. Most of these
cases were brought under
RLUIPA. The substantial
amount of litigation is due in
part to the failure of Congress
to dene key terms in the stat-
ute, which is requiring the
courts to interpret legislative
intent and constitutional stan-
dards of review. Unfortunately,
the district courts and circuit
courts have also failed to arrive
at uniform denitions and tests,
creating even more confusion
and uncertainty for applicants
and municipalities alike. All
eyes were on the Supreme
Court this fall when they had
an opportunity to grant cert in
the 7th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case of Vision Church,
United Methodist v. Village of
Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975.
Many RLUIPA case followers
were disappointed that the
Court denied cert, leaving for
another day the opportunity to
review the constitutionality of
the statute, as well as a uniform
test for what constitutes a sub-
stantial burden on the exercise
of religion and what constitutes
a compelling government inter-
est to justify a regulation that
does impose a substantial bur-
den on religious exercise. What
follows are just a few examples
of recent RLUIPA cases of in-
terest.
The 7th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals saw the most RLUIPA
activity in the last six months
with three reported decisions.
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The rst one was previously
discussed in the condemnation/
eminent domain section. In the
Village of Long Grove (Illi-
nois) case, cited above, the
Church sued alleging that the
Village’s denial of their ap-
plication for voluntary annex-
ation, its subsequent involun-
tary annexation of their
property, its enactment of a
municipal Public Assembly
Ordinance, and its denial of
their applications for a special
use permit to build and occupy
a church on real property it had
purchased violated the 1st and
14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (‘‘RLU-
IPA’’), and various Illinois
laws. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of
the Village and the Seventh
Circuit armed. According to
the Village’s ‘‘Comprehensive
Plan,’’ it is dedicated to pre-
serving its ‘‘rural character,’’
to the ‘‘provision of a quiet
countryside’’ and to the enjoy-
ment of ‘‘open space.’’ The
Zoning Regulations permit re-
ligious institutions (and other
uses) as ‘‘special uses’’ in ar-
eas zoned as ‘‘R1,’’ ‘‘R2’’ and
‘‘R3’’ Residential Districts. At
the time of the initial applica-
tion, the property owned by Vi-
sion Church was not located in
the Village boundaries, but in
its application, the Church re-
quested as a condition of an-
nexation that the Village zone
its property ‘‘Residential
(R2)’’ and grant it a ‘‘special
use’’ permit to construct a
church complex on the proper-
ty. Vision’s proposed plans
called for a 99,000-square foot
church facility, consisting of
ve main buildings and a sanc-
tuary with over 1,000 seats. At
the request of the Village, the
Church submitted a revised
plan, decreasing the size of the
church to 56,200 square feet,
consisting of three main build-
ings (a sanctuary, an adminis-
tration building and a Sunday
school building); the sanctuary
would seat 600 instead of
1,000; and parking spaces were
reduced from 400 to 240. In ad-
dition, the Church agreed to
comply with some, but not all,
of the Village’s conditions on
construction. In August 2001,
the Plan Commission voted to
recommend the denial of the
Church’s application for an-
nexation, and this recommen-
dation was accepted by the Vil-
lage Board of Trustees.
Subsequently, due to an an-
nexation of an adjacent piece or
property, the Village involun-
tarily annexed the Church
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property. The Village zoned
the property ‘‘R2’’ Residential,
the zoning classication sought
by the Church in its June 2000
application for voluntary an-
nexation. In April 2002 an
amendment to the Village’s
Zoning Regulations was en-
acted restricting the size and
capacity of buildings used for
‘‘public assembly,’’ such as
‘‘religious institutions, aquari-
ums, libraries, museums, pri-
vate schools, and other similar
uses.’’ (‘‘Assembly Ordi-
nance’’) Specically, it pro-
vides that a complex comprised
of three buildings located on
fteen or more acres, but not
fronting a state highway, can-
not exceed a total square foot-
age of 55,000. It also imposes
restrictions on parking, set-
backs from the road and the
ow of trac. In January 2002,
approximately four months
prior to the passage of the As-
sembly Ordinance, the Church
applied for such a permit. How-
ever, instead of the 56,200-
square foot complex discussed
in March 2001 during negotia-
tions over voluntary annex-
ation, the Church requested ap-
proval in its special use
application for the original
99,000-square foot, 5-building,
1,000-seat sanctuary facility
originally proposed in 2000.
The application was denied.
The Circuit court found that
by permitting churches in all
residential districts as a special
use, the municipality has not
completely or totally excluded
religious assemblies from its
jurisdiction, and the Court
noted that six churches cur-
rently operate within the Vil-
lage. The Court continued,
‘‘The requirement that
churches obtain a special use
permit is neutral on its face and
is justied by legitimate, non-
discriminatory municipal plan-
ning goals.’’ The Court further
held that the land use regula-
tions violated neither the Estab-
lishment Clause nor the equal
terms clause of RLUIPA since
they applied equally to all as-
sembly uses, whether or not
religious in nature.
In a second case, the 7th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found
that the exclusion of religious
uses from a buer zone might
violate RLUIPA’s ‘‘equal
terms’’ provision. Arising in
Indiana, Digrugilliers v. Con-
solidated City of Indianapolis,
2007 WL 3151201 involved a
Baptist Church that leased
space in a building located in a
C-1 district, designated as a
commercial oce-buer dis-
trict, and religious uses were
not allowed in the district with-
out rst obtaining a variance.
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The Seventh Circuit overturned
the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction re-
quested by the Church nding
that such requirement may vio-
late the equal terms provision
of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) since other similar
uses are allowed as of right (42
U.S.C. sec. 2000cc et seq. for-
bids local governments from
imposing or implementing a
land use regulation ‘‘in a man-
ner . . . that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less
than equal terms with a nonreli-
gious assembly or institu-
tion’’).
Among the uses allowed in a
C-1 district without the need
for a variance are: assisted-
living facilities, auditoriums,
assembly halls, community
centers, senior citizen centers
and day-care centers. Although
the City pointed out that
churches are allowed in SU-1
districts (special use), the Court
noted that even if it was an o-
set, it could not eliminate any
discrimination if such was
found to exist. The Court also
stated that the existence of al-
ternative sites for the church is
only relevant when the zoning
ordinance is challenged as im-
posing a ‘‘substantial burden’’
on religious use of land. Al-
though the District Court also
found persuasive the fact that
State law forbids the sale of
alcohol within 200 feet of a
church and pornography within
500 feet, and these two uses are
allowed in the C-1 district, the
Circuit Court rst noted that no
evidence suggests that either
use is currently in existence,
and to argue that the govern-
ment has created ‘‘protective
zones’’ for religion constitutes
discrimination in favor of reli-
gion. The Court said, ‘‘Govern-
ment cannot, by granting
churches special privileges
. . . furnish the premise for
excluding churches from other-
wise suitable districts.’’ Since
the Court concluded that the
church’s claim that the City is
violating RLUIPA has at least
some, and possibly great, merit,
it was an error for the District
Court to deny the church a tem-
porary injunction.
In a long awaited decision
from the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaron-
eck, 2007 WL 3011061, the
Court found not only that the
Village violated RLUIPA be-
cause the denial of approvals
for the expansion of a religious
school constituted a substantial
burden on the exercise of reli-
gion and the Village failed to
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prove a compelling govern-
mental interest to justify the
burden, but more signicantly,
for the rst time this Circuit
Court determined that the stat-
ute is constitutional. Early
RLUIPA cases in the district
courts led some practitioners to
believe that perhaps RLUIPA
was unconstitutional. With
most of the Circuit Court of
Appeals now weighing in on
the subject, however, there is
less conict as the Appeals
Courts are nding the Act con-
stitutional.
This decision was the latest
in a ve year battle between the
Village of Mamaroneck, NY
and the Westchester Hebrew
Day School over the construc-
tion of a new school building.
The School rst submitted an
application to the zoning board
for modication of its special
use permit to enable it to pro-
ceed with a $12 million expan-
sion project in October 2001.
In February 2002, the Board
voted unanimously to issue a
negative declaration under the
State Environmental Quality
Review Act, meaning the proj-
ect would have no signicant
environmental impacts. Fol-
lowing public opposition, the
negative declaration was re-
scinded in August 2002. Rather
than submit a full Environmen-
tal Impact Statement, the
school commenced a lawsuit
alleging that the rescission vio-
lated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). Following a
ruling by the District court in
2002 that the negative declara-
tion was not properly re-
scinded, the zoning board held
hearings on the merits of the
application and denied the ap-
plication in May 2003. The de-
nial was based upon the impact
of the project on trac, con-
cerns over parking and the in-
tensity of the use, but these
grounds were identied after
the hearings and aording no
opportunity for the School to
respond. The District Court de-
termined that the denial was
not supported by evidence in
the record. After a number of
procedural issues decided by
the District Court and the Cir-
cuit Court, following a seven-
day bench trial in November
2005, the Court ordered the
Village to issue the special per-
mit, and the Village appealed.
The Second Circuit said that
the expansion of a school build-
ing used for religious purposes
constitutes an exercise of reli-
gion. The Court explained that
the following uses, just because
they may be proposed by a reli-
gious organization, might not
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constitute a ‘‘religious exer-
cise:’’ a school gymnasium
used soley for sporting activi-
ties; the building of a residence
on school property for a head-
master; and the construction of
additional oce space for a
school. None of these were at
issue in this case. With respect
to substantial burden, the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted the coer-
cion test set forth in the 11th
Circuit’s Midrashi opinion
(366 F.3d 1214), stating that
‘‘when there has been a denial
of a religious institution’s
building application, courts ap-
propriately speak of govern-
ment action that directly co-
erces the religious institution to
change its behavior, rather than
government action that forces
the religious entity to choose
between religious precepts and
government benets.’’ The
Court said that an absolute re-
jection of the proposed plan, as
in this case, was dierent from
a rejection of a submitted plan
that left open the possibility of
approval of a resubmission
with modications designed to
address the cited problem.
Whether a conditional approval
will constitute a substantial
burden will depend upon
whether there is a ‘‘reasonable
opportunity for the institution
to submit a modied applica-
tion, the denial does not place
substantial pressure of it to
change its behavior . . . ’’
The Court also noted that a
substantial burden claim may
exist where land use restric-
tions are imposed arbitrarily,
capriciously or unlawfully. The
Second Circuit noted that in
this case, the Village Zoning
Board acted unlawfully under
New York State law because
their decision was based on
grounds ‘‘unrelated to the pub-
lic’s health, safety or welfare.’’
In an attempt to show a com-
pelling governmental interest,
the Village raised trac and
parking concerns. While these
are compelling governmental
interests, in this case the Court
found insucient evidence in
the record to prove these were
legitimate concerns, beyond
mere public opposition to the
project. Lastly, with respect to
the Village’s actions, the Court
determined that even if they
could articulate a compelling
governmental interest, the Vil-
lage did not satisfy the least re-
strictive means requirement
since their denial of the ap-
plication was absolute. The
Court relied on the District
Court’s ndings that the ZBA
members were not credible
when they testied that they
would give reasonable consid-
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eration to another application
by the School. The Court said,
‘‘When the board’s expressed
willingness to consider a modi-
ed proposal is insincere, we
do not require an institution to
le a modied proposal before
determining that its religious
exercise has been substantially
burdened.’’ Furthermore, the
Court observed that ‘‘The ZBA
had the opportunity to approve
the application subject to con-
ditions, but refused to consider
doing so.’’
Concluding that the Village
violated RLUIPA, the Second
Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of the Act. The Court
said RLUIPA does not violate
the Commerce Clause (so long
as the jurisdictional element is
satised that there is a minimal
eect on commerce), it does
not run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment (‘‘We do not be-
lieve RLUIPA directly com-
pels states to require or prohibit
any particular acts. Instead,
RLUIPA leaves it to each state
to enact and enforce land use
regulations as it deems appro-
priate so long as the state does
not substantially burden reli-
gious exercise in the absence
of a compelling interests
achieved by the least restrictive
means.’’), and that it does not
violate the Establishment
Clause (‘‘the principal primary
eect of RLUIPA’s land use
provisions neither advances
nor inhibits religion.’’).
Signs and Billboards
Perhaps the hottest ‘‘new’’
issue in the area of regulating
signs and billboards has been
how to address electronic mes-
sage boards, or billboards that
can change the messages every
thirty seconds. A number of
municipalities have started to
discuss and ban the use of these
signs, and the Federal Highway
Administration has published
guidance for states about the
regulation of these digital
signs. Municipalities in New
Hampshire, Kentucky and
Massachusetts have recently
considered and/or enacted bans
on these types of signs, and
practitioners are awaiting a rul-
ing from the First Circuit on the
constitutionality of prohibi-
tions on these types of signs in
the New Hampshire case of
Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of
Concord, United States District
Court, New Hampshire, 2007
WL 1847307.
The City of Concord, New
Hampshire, enacted a sign code
that bans all signs ‘‘that move
or create the illusion of move-
ment, signs which are or appear
to be animated or projected,
ZONING AND LAND USE PLANNING
503
signs that aect or look similar
to trac signs or signals, and
electronic message center
(EMC) type signs’’ without
regard to the content of the
sign. Naser Jewelers, Inc. (NJI)
sought a preliminary injunction
in federal district court. The
magistrate recommended the
preliminary injunction be de-
nied because he concluded that
NJI was unlikely to succeed on
the merits using the Central
Hudson test (Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
The district court agreed
with the proposed disposition,
but disagreed thatCentral Hud-
son controls this decision be-
cause the city’s sign code is
content neutral. The district
court concluded the sign code
passes constitutional muster
under the time, place, and man-
ner test described in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989). A content-neutral
regulation must meet an ‘‘in-
termediate scrutiny test,’’ the
regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve a signicant
government interest and allow
for reasonable alternative chan-
nels of communication. The
court noted that the city’s inter-
ests in trac safety and com-
munity aesthetics each consti-
tute a substantial governmental
interest. The sign code is suf-
ciently narrowly tailored be-
cause the city has not prohib-
ited all signs, ‘‘only those signs
the city plausibly thinks will
adversely aect trac safety,
or prove detrimental to aes-
thetic values the city seeks to
promote.’’
In an interesting case from
Pennsylvania, the Common-
wealth Court held that portable
search lights constitute a sign
under a local zoning ordinance.
In Sutli Enterprises, Inc. v.
Silver Spring Tp. Zoning Hear-
ing Bd., 2007 WL 2827744, A
car dealership told the local
zoning ocer that the portable
searchlights would not be per-
manently mounted and that the
purpose of the lights would be
to ‘‘call attention generally to
the business locations and on
occasion to specic promo-
tional sales and events.’’ Both
the zoning ocer, and on ap-
peal, the zoning board, con-
cluded that the searchlights
constituted a sign because they
were being used to communi-
cate a message. As such, the
use of the lights were imper-
missible under the zoning ordi-
nance because it prohibits ‘‘ro-
tating or oscillating signs,’’ and
because the sign ordinance re-
quires that oodlight or spot-
lights be shielded so that there
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is no direct light transmitted to
other properties or rights-of-
ways. The Pennsylvania Ap-
peals Court agreed with the
zoning board that the lights
constituted a ‘‘sign’’ under the
zoning ordinance which denes
‘‘sign’’ as ‘‘[a] device for vi-
sual communication that is
used to bring the subject to the
attention of the public . . . .’’
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down three
billboard decisions at the end
of 2007 all upholding the con-
stitutionality of sign ordinances
from the cities of San Diego,
Oakland, and Beaumont. InGet
Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San
Diego, 2007 WL 3197108, af-
ter Get Outdoors led twenty-
four applications for billboard
permits with the City, the city
ocial informed the represen-
tative that the City ordinance
prohibited new billboards, but
agreed to review the applica-
tions. Following a review of
the applications, the City de-
nied them, noting that the City
Code prohibits new signs bear-
ing o-site messages, that each
of the permits was missing key
documents, and that the pro-
posed billboards violated the
size and height restrictions in
the City law. In response to the
initial ling of the lawsuit, the
City enacted several legislative
amendments to the law, includ-
ing a ‘‘message substitution’’
clause, a 45-day deadline for
decisions on all permit applica-
tions, and a judicial review pro-
vision. As a result, the District
Court granted summary judg-
ment for the City.
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the billboard
size and height restrictions do
not violate the First Amend-
ment because they were a rea-
sonable time, place and manner
regulation designed ‘‘to opti-
mize communication and qual-
ity of signs while protecting the
public and aesthetic character
of the City.’’ The Court also
noted that the City had cali-
brated its size and height re-
strictions for ‘‘ground signs,’’
which include billboards, to the
width of adjacent public rights-
of-way and the speed limit. The
Court determined that the re-
strictions are not substantially
broader than necessary to pro-
tect the City’s interests in traf-
c safety and aesthetics, they
directly advance the city’s in-
terests, and they leave open
alternative avenues of com-
munication. The Court further
concluded that Get Outdoors
II’s permit applications vio-
lated these restrictions, and that
therefore it lacked standing to
challenge the ban on o-
premises messages.
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The second case, Desert
Outdoor Advertising v. City of
Oakland, 506 F.3d 798, arose
after Desert Outdoor Advertis-
ing erected three signs in the
City of Oakland, two of which
were visible from the freeway
and contained commercial ad-
vertising unrelated to the pre-
mises, and one visible from the
highway that said ‘‘Volunteer
to Be a Big Brother,’’ and
‘‘Pray at First Baptist Church.’’
The City ordered the signs re-
moved as they were in viola-
tion of their sign regulations.
The City also denied a variance
request for the noncommercial
signs for failure to meet the
criteria set forth in the local
regulations. Desert Outdoor
brought both a facial and an as
applied challenge to the sign
regulations. The Municipal
Code prohibits signs adjacent
to freeways by providing that,
‘‘[n]o sign shall be erected,
constructed, relocated or main-
tained in the City of Oakland if
such sign is designed to have or
has the advertising thereon
maintained primarily to be
viewed from a freeway.’’ The
regulation provided for four
exceptions that include: signs
that identify the name of the
person, rm, or business oc-
cupying the premises and the
type of business conducted
thereon; signs that identify the
product manufactured on the
premises; signs limited to a
certain size relating to the sale,
lease, hire or display of the
building premises, and time
and temperature units. No vari-
ances are permitted under the
freeway sign ordinance. The
City Planning Code banned the
construction of new ‘‘advertis-
ing signs’’ anywhere within the
City, but prior to the amend-
ment, the Code allowed for
variances only if four condi-
tions were met: 1) strict com-
pliance would result in practi-
cal diculty or unnecessary
hardship inconsistent with the
zoning regulations, due to
unique physical or topographic
circumstances or conditions of
design; 2) strict compliance
would deprive the applicant of
the privileges enjoyed by own-
ers of similarly zoned property;
3) a variance could not ad-
versely aect character, liv-
ability, or appropriate develop-
ment of abutting properties or
the surrounding area, or be det-
rimental to the public welfare;
and 4) a variance cannot con-
stitute a grant of special privi-
lege. The third condition was
repealed during the pendency
of the lawsuit.
With respect to the facial
challenge to the sign provisions
REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 36: 484 2008]
506
in the Municipal Code, the
Court noted that the regulations
ban only signs that are visible
from the highway and that con-
tain advertising, or commercial
speech. The Court said that
‘‘advertising’’ does not imply
noncommercial speech. The
regulations the municipality
relied on to deny the noncom-
mercial signs were contained in
the Oakland Planning Code,
and not the Oakland Municipal
Code, the regulation that Desert
challenged. Although Desert
argued that the Municipal Code
provision contained unconsti-
tutional content-based excep-
tions, the Court found that of
all of the exemptions, the only
one that was problematic was
the exception for time and tem-
perature units (because this is
noncommercial speech), and
the Court concluded that this
particular exception was not
enough to demonstrate that the
City intended for the regulation
to apply to noncommercial
speech (in any event, the City
did not appeal the District
Court’s decision to sever this
provision from the regulation).
The Court held that the regula-
tion does not impermissibly
favor commercial speech over
noncommercial speech and that
it does not regulate speech
based upon content.
With respect to Desert’s as
applied challenge, the Court
noted that the Municipal Code
provides a at ban on such ad-
vertising and does not allow for
variances. Therefore, City of-
cials had no discretion when
applying the law to Desert’s
signs. Turning to the amend-
ment adopted by the City which
was extended to be eective for
90 days after the Court of Ap-
peals decision at which time
the City will adopted perma-
nent amendments to the Code,
the Court noted that the provi-
sion was adopted to eliminate
one of the four conditions re-
quired before a variance could
be granted (see above). Desert
argued that even with the elimi-
nation of this criteria, City of-
cials were still left with undue
discretion to permit or deny
variances. The Court dis-
agreed, nding that the remain-
ing criteria, while not necessar-
ily exact or explicit, were not
too abstract, and not signi-
cantly concrete enough to re-
strict subjectivity. As a result,
the Court was satised that the
amended regulation ‘‘contains
appropriate standards cabining
the [City’s] discretion.’’ The
Ninth Circuit concluded that
the two sign ordinances chal-
lenged, as amended, are both
constitutional, facially and as
applied to Desert.
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In the third case, Outdoor
Media Group, Inc. v. City of
Beaumont, 2007 WL 3197112,
following a challenge to a de-
nial of a permit to erect four
billboards at a highway inter-
section on the grounds that the
signs ‘‘would result in exces-
sive, undue and adverse visual
intrusion . . . by adding unre-
lated advertising to a future
new commercial facility’’ and
because the billboards would
‘‘have a detrimental eect on
the general public, health,
safety and welfare by adversely
aecting existing views of open
space and visual relief and fu-
ture views of new commercial
development,’’ the City of
Beaumont (California) re-
pealed their sign ordinance and
replaced it with a new one that
specically bans new bill-
boards. The original ordinance
was challenged on the grounds
that it granted discretion to the
planning commission without
standards for review, that it
regulated more commercial
speech than was necessary to
advance a substantial govern-
mental interest, and that it im-
permissibly burdened non-
commercial speech greater
than commercial speech and
favored some non-commercial
messages over others.
The City rst sought dis-
missal of the challenge that the
billboard company failed to
exhaust its state administrative
remedies, but the Court ex-
plained that dierent from a
takings case, such action is not
a prerequisite to a proceeding
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Circuit Court did uphold the
District Court’s determination
that the repeal of the com-
plained of sign ordinance
moots the claims for declara-
tory and injunctive relief since
there is no longer any risk that
the billboard company will be
subject to the challenged ordi-
nance. The Court found no
merit to the argument that the
City would simply re-enact the
old ordinance at a later date,
noting, ‘‘The new ordinance,
forbidding all billboards, ac-
complishes the city’s stated
goals of limiting visual clutter
and preserving commercial vi-
ability of future developments,
meaning the city has no motive
to re-enact a constitutionally
suspect ordinance to accom-
plish the same objective.’’ The
Circuit Court found that the
new ordinance cures the consti-
tutional deciencies com-
plained of with respect to the
original ordinance since: the
ban on new billboards now
only requires the planning
commission to make a determi-
nation as to whether the pro-
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posed sign is an o-site sign,
and this does not constitute un-
bridled discretion; the rationale
for the new ordinance is based
on aesthetic harm which is a
substantial governmental inter-
est; and the new ordinance con-
tains a message substitution
clause that permits the substitu-
tion of noncommercial content
for existing copy on any other-
wise permissible sign, curing
any potentially impermissible
burdens on noncommercial
speech caused by the o-site
ban. With respect to the bill-
board company’s due process
claim, the Circuit Court upheld
the District Court’s dismissal
nding that there was no vested
property right in an unapproved
billboard permit application.
However, the Circuit Court de-
termined that the District Court
erred in dismissing the First
Amendment and Equal Protec-
tion claims on this ground since
the establishment of a vested
property right is irrelevant to
such a challenge.
With respect to the First
Amendment claims, the court
found that the old sign ordi-
nance did not impermissibly
grant unbridled discretion to
the permitting authority, that it
was not an unconstitutional
regulation of commercial
speech, and that the ordinance
was not in violation of the over-
breadth doctrine. The Court
also upheld the dismissal of the
Equal Protection claim, since
billboards are not in a protected
class and the regulation was
rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest.
The Circuit Court did nd,
however, that the old ordi-
nance’s o-site ban was a broad
prohibition that seemed to
reach beyond o-site commer-
cial copy and could include
noncommercial messages, and
that it lacked the safeguard of
the substitution clause con-
tained in the new ordinance.
Furthermore, the Court noted
that the old ordinance may have
impermissibly regulated non-
commercial speech on the basis
of content since it exempted
certain noncommercial o-site
signs from the permit require-
ment (e.g., political signs and
certain directional signs). Since
the case was before the court
on a motion to dismiss, the
Court said that record was not
yet ripe to fully consider these
claims.
Conclusion
With hundreds of reported
land use cases in the second
half of 2007, land use and real
estate lawyers are challenged
to keep current and to monitor
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the trends in fast-developing
areas within this practice. Law
of the Land oers one such ve-
hicle, and provides readers with
an option of registering for
email notication as new cases
are posted. When time permits,
check out the growing number
of land use law related blogs in
cyberspace. A rich amount of
information is available to as-
sist in real estate practice.
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